Concepts Are Situated Simulations, Not Abstract Definitions

This axiom articulates the embodied/grounded cognition view of conceptual representation: concepts aren't abstract symbols but reenactments of perceptual, motor, and affective experiences. This is foundational because it identifies what concepts are at the cognitive level, with direct implications for how they're learned.

Barsalou's (1999) perceptual symbol systems theory and extensive subsequent research show that conceptual processing activates the same sensorimotor regions involved in direct experience. Thinking about "chair" activates visual processing areas (shape), motor areas (sitting action), and tactile regions (texture). Crucially, these simulations are situated—"chair" in "auditorium" produces different simulations than "chair" in "dentist office." This contradicts classical views of concepts as abstract, amodal symbols with dictionary-style definitions. Evidence includes: (1) modality-specific interference effects, (2) neural reuse of perceptual systems, (3) context-dependent conceptual processing.

For curriculum design, this axiom argues against purely definitional or abstract instruction. Concepts must be grounded in concrete, perceptual examples within specific contexts. Teaching "recursion" requires simulation-rich scenarios (visual fractals, hands-on tracing, embodied metaphors), not just formal definitions. Multiple situated contexts help students build flexible conceptual simulations rather than brittle abstract rules. This explains why examples matter so profoundly—they're not illustrating abstract concepts; they're constituting the concept through grounded simulation.